


MIGRATION JUNCTIONS IN INDIA AND INDONESIA

Reimagining Places, Reorienting Policy

By Mukta Naik and Gregory Randolph

April 2018



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Introduction

The geopolitics of the 21st century are increasingly drawing attention to the complexities of international migration. Policymakers in a diverse range of countries are torn between the empirical evidence that immigration is generally good for economies and societies¹ and the increasing hostility with which polities – particularly in the industrialized world – view large-scale cross-border migration. These competing narratives are already reshaping public debate around human mobility, from South Africa to Sweden.

In reality, most of the world's migrants have never crossed an international border.

However, in reality, most of the world's migrants have never crossed an international border. As per a 2014 estimate, compared to 232 million international migrants – about 3.2 percent of the world's population at the time – three times that number (740 million) moved within national borders. In other words, about one in 10 people throughout the world is an internal migrant.² The phenomenon of large-scale internal migration receives less attention in global policy debates; it is less documented, less understood, and less accounted for in governance and policymaking than international migration. Nevertheless, the movement of people within countries is fundamental to the processes of social and economic change that many nations are witnessing – particularly those in the developing world.

While governments are aware of the fact that economic development often induces the large-scale movement of people, many fail to account for these mobilities across the full range of policy areas that migration has high potential to impact. Policy institutions in spheres as diverse as education, skill development, social protection, labor regulation, infrastructure provision and urban planning must understand the nature and evolution of human mobility. This imperative is even greater in emerging economies where internal migration is an important feature of rapid economic and social change. If countries in the global South are to leverage structural transformation in ways that promote long-term social and economic development, they must engage in practices of planning and policymaking that account for migrants and their well-being.

Despite the importance of planning for human mobility within borders, the understanding of internal migration is still limited by anachronistic tropes and false assumptions. First, internal migration is popularly imagined as the movement of impoverished people from rural villages to large megacities³ in a 'push-pull' mechanism:⁴ people are pushed out of economically distressed villages and pulled to cities where wage rates are higher and opportunities numerous. This narrative – unchanged for over a century and persistently unquestioned in popular culture and much of the academic literature in development economics – tends to highlight a singular, linear migration story. This story is not so much inaccurate as it is incomplete.

Second, internal migration is generally assumed to be the direct cause of – or even a proxy for – increasing rates of urbanization. Because internal migration is popularly imagined as the movement of villagers to mega-cities, urbanization is seen as a simple, straightforward process, where cities balloon through the influx of rural workers.

In countries like India and Indonesia, the thrust of urban policy has focused on large cities, with governments seeking to reverse rural-urban migration through rural development policies or exclusionary tactics.

A growing stock of research and data, which highlights an increase in patterns of mobility like short-term migration and commuting, finds that internal migration is not necessarily dominated by a singular kind of rural-urban migration and establishes the possibility that a range of non-metropolitan geographies – from small cities to “rurban” agglomerations – often play important functions in supporting economic activity and attracting migrants. These recent findings indicate that earlier assumptions about internal migration are oversimplified. In this report we will explore, emerging scholarship that show that the internal migration landscape in most countries, especially large emerging economies, is rich and complex – with many different kinds of migrants, push and pull factors, and pathways.

The literature on complex patterns of urbanization and migration piqued our interest in understanding geographies that might be origins as well as destinations, places that exist at

the crossroads of migration pathways. This report seeks to identify these ‘migration junctions’ by using the empirical tool of “migrant-intensity,” which we introduced in earlier academic work.⁵

What is at stake in narrow conceptions of internal migration? Frankly, they lead to bad policy. Without recognition of the complexity and multiplicity of migrant pathways and types of migrants, governments have repeatedly and reflexively blamed the problems of urban mismanagement – congestion, pollution, and informality – on the volume of migrants. In countries like India and Indonesia, the thrust of urban policy has focused on large cities, with governments seeking to reverse rural-urban migration through rural development policies or exclusionary tactics aimed at making cities less attractive to newcomers.

An in-depth understanding of internal migration is vital not only for countries to understand the spatial manifestations of economic development, but also to make smart decisions regarding the future of cities and people. Data that show where migrants are choosing to relocate, the length of time they stay, how many migrations they undertake, and whether they return home – among other observations – are invaluable to shaping effective policies on the management of migration and urbanization. More importantly, migration data must be examined from multiple angles and with respect to the many different stories they contain. Today, policymakers in most countries lack the analytical tools that can capture the texture and complexity of internal migration patterns.

Migration junctions are geographies where migration is especially influential in shaping present and future outcomes and where policymakers are likely to confront particular migration-related challenges and opportunities.

This report aspires to provide an alternative lens through which governments, researchers, and other stakeholders can see and interpret patterns of internal migration. It builds on the growing body of literature that charts multiple migration pathways, but rather than focus on the *flows* of migrants, we seek to examine the *places* most profoundly transformed by internal migration. While previous scholars have used similar terms, mainly to mean high levels of in-migration,⁶ in a previous paper,⁷ we introduced the term “migrant-intensity” and used it in a particular sense: to identify places that experience high levels of in- and out-migration simultaneously. Our contention is not that this tool is the only effective lens through which internal migration must be understood; rather, we argue that it helps to highlight *migration junctions* – geographies where migration is especially influential in shaping present and future outcomes and where policymakers are likely to confront particular migration-related challenges and opportunities.

In deploying this empirical approach, we focus on India and Indonesia, two emerging economies where internal migration is an important feature of structural transformation and where maximizing economic opportunities for youth

– i.e. leveraging the “demographic dividend” – is an urgent policy goal. Robust policy frameworks that target migration junctions, we argue, must be part of a comprehensive strategy to promote the social and economic welfare and mobility of internal migrants. In emphasizing place, we are aware that we provoke discussions around the capabilities and possibilities of policymaking at local and regional scales, including urban local bodies and provincial governments that remain at varying levels of empowerment within the decentralized governance structures of India and Indonesia. As such, thinking from the perspective of place requires a distinctly territorial framework, which is emerging as an important agenda in global discussions on sustainable and inclusive urbanization following the adoption of the New Urban Agenda.ⁱ

The policy note is organized into four parts. The following section offers a context-setting comparison between India and Indonesia, on migration and urbanization trends. The next section explains the methodology and data used in these two countries to identify migration junctions – i.e. the particulars behind the “migrant-intensity” empirical tool. A description of the migration junctions in both countries follows. The last section offers an analysis of these results and compares and contrasts trends in the landscape of identified migration junctions in India and Indonesia. In the conclusion, we draw policy implications and outline areas for future research, focusing on the themes of workforce development, service provision, and urban governance.

ⁱ India and Indonesia are signatories to the UN Habitat’s New Urban Agenda.

Migration and Urbanization in India and Indonesia

EMERGENT GEOGRAPHIES AND MOBILITY PATHWAYS

Despite India's larger size in comparison with Indonesia, both in terms of populationⁱⁱ and Gross Domestic Product,ⁱⁱⁱ the two countries make for a valuable comparison because they are at similar stages in their structural transformation. The percentage of GDP contributed by agriculture, manufacturing and services in India (Indonesia) was 17 (13) percent, 16 (21) percent and 53 (45) percent, respectively, for the year 2016.⁸ Both countries are looking to leverage their "demographic dividend" by creating employment opportunities for their sizeable youth populations. The segment of the population aged 15 to 24 comprises 19.1 percent of India's population and 17.3 percent of Indonesia's.⁹ In both countries, large numbers of young people are seeking pathways out of agriculture and entering non-farm work. Between 2000 and 2017, the labor force grew annually by 6.79 million in India and 1.77 million in Indonesia.¹⁰

From a workforce composition perspective, however, India still employs the plurality of its workforce in the primary sector (48.9 percent), while 12.6 percent are employed in industry. The majority of non-farm workers are in the service sector, which employs 58.7 percent in urban areas and 16.1 percent in rural areas of the country.¹¹ In contrast, only a third of Indonesia's workforce is

in the primary sector, while industry and services comprise 24.6 and 42 percent of the workforce. Manufacturing, therefore, plays a much more significant role in employment as compared to India.¹²

In both India and Indonesia, like many other countries experiencing high levels of economic growth, migration and urbanization are prominent features of the process of structural transformation.

In both India and Indonesia, like many other countries experiencing high levels of economic growth, migration and urbanization are prominent features of the process of structural transformation. Both countries have urbanized rapidly in recent decades, though Indonesia has urbanized faster, at the annual rate of about 4.2 percent between 2000 and 2010, and is currently 54.5 percent urban. India's annual rate of urbanization was 2.8 percent between 2001 and 2011, and the country is still only 33.1 percent urban¹³ – though many scholars believe this figure is a gross underestimate.¹⁴ Both India and Indonesia have seen large-scale suburbanization in their major metropolitan regions as well as fast growth in secondary cities like Pune, Jaipur, and Ahmedabad in India and Batam, Makassar and Medan in Indonesia.

ⁱⁱ India's population is 1.3 billion compared to Indonesia's 258 million. India is also denser with 441 ppl/sq.km. compared to 142 ppl/sq.km. in Indonesia.

ⁱⁱⁱ India's GDP in 2016 was US\$2.2 trillion, while Indonesia's was US\$932 billion as per World Bank estimates

Both countries also host regions where urban and rural are interwoven in dense, complex agglomerations, a pattern termed *desakota* (Indonesian for “village-city”) by McGee to describe the province of West Java. He described these landscapes as “regions of an intense mixture of agricultural and non-agricultural activities that often stretch along corridors between large city cores.”¹⁵ With growing infrastructure investment and the penetration of manufacturing activities deeper into once-rural regencies throughout Java and Sumatra, Indonesia is witnessing the proliferation of *desakota* geographies on an even greater scale than before. Regions of a similar character are prevalent in some areas of India, too, notably in the southwestern coastal state of Kerala. Furthermore, recent work on dispersed urbanization in India points to the growth of smaller cities and an in-situ process of urbanization, where rural areas gradually become urban owing to increasing density and non-agricultural economic activity.¹⁶

Corresponding to the shifting geographical patterns and the prevalence of mixed rural-urban spaces, migration patterns in both countries are also complex and diverse. They resist the simple conflation of structural transformation with linear rural-urban movements; instead, multiple trajectories and pathways exist simultaneously.

More than the total composition of internal migrants – which grew from 30 percent to 30.8 percent in India from 2001 to 2011^{iv} as compared to the previous inter-census period, and in fact

declined slightly in Indonesia between the period 1995-2000 and 2005-^{v,17} – factors like the drivers, geographies, distances and trajectories of migration have become important to study.

Migration is one way that labor is distributed in geographies where demand is highest. In India, there has been a general pattern of employment-linked migration of low-income migrants from the less developed and least urbanized states in the northern and eastern parts of the country to more developed and relatively more urbanized and industrialized states in the south and west, as well as to higher-income agrarian states like Punjab.¹⁸ If looked at by migration stream, however, rural-urban migration comprised only 22.1 percent of total internal migration in the period from 2001 to 2011, while rural-rural migration remains dominant as in previous inter-census periods. It is important to note though that there has been a marked increase in urban-urban migration, from 15.2 percent in 1991-2001 to 22.6 percent in 2001-2011. This illustrates the growing importance of urban geographies in India’s internal migration story.

While much of India’s migration occurs over short distances,¹⁹ within the state or even the district, Indonesia has seen an increase in long-distance migration – defined as movements between regional corridors – between the period 1995-2000 and 2005-2010, perhaps fuelled by stronger transport linkages between provinces. In the same period, the share of the population undertaking short-distance migrations decreased.²⁰ These data

^{iv} Figures for the composition of internal migrants by place of birth in total population, Census of India

^v Migration has reduced in both inter-district (-8.5 percent) and inter-provincial (-3.5 percent) terms in 2000-2010.

have to be understood, however, in the context of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which had profound effects on the Indonesian labor market and induced return migration from urban to rural areas.²¹ Once available, newer migration data will offer a better comparison to the 2005-2010 period. Urban areas in Indonesia are estimated to be growing at 4.1 percent per year, faster than other Asian countries; some of this growth is fuelled by internal migration.²²

These trends highlight the strong linkages between urban and rural economies; in both countries, labor migration is a coping strategy for households that seek to emerge from rural poverty. Breman, who conducted in-depth research in both countries, refers to this as “footloose migration.”²³ While official data in India estimated that about 9.25 million rural households had short-term migrants in 2007-08, constituting only about 4.4 percent of the rural workforce at the time, field studies claim substantially higher numbers – from 40 million to as high as 100 million – and suggest that short-term migration is on the rise in India.²⁴

The Indonesian government does not release public data on inter-district and non-permanent movements, limiting most research institutions to the study of permanent, inter-provincial migration. This makes shifts in migration patterns harder to examine at a granular level. From colonial times, migration policy and research in Indonesia has been fairly limited in scope, generally focused on ways to redistribute people

from dense and populous areas in Java to the less developed northern and eastern islands.^{vi}

Improved transport links in both countries as well as the intertwined nature of the rural and the urban has meant an increase in people commuting to work in cities. In Java, Indonesia, rural workers were commuting to industrialized areas near cities as early as the 1990s. In India too, recent evidence shows both rural-urban as well as urban-rural commuting, explained by wage differentials and changes in the spatial distribution of economic activities.²⁵ However, despite their growing importance, data systems in both countries fail to capture these short-term and commuter movements;^{vii} nor are the linkages between internal and international migration captured adequately by data, despite indications by many scholars that these exist.²⁶

Emergent urban forms combined with improvements in transportation infrastructure go hand-in-hand with mobilities that include seasonal and short-term movements, commuting and even return migration.

It is clear, therefore, that migration in both countries needs to be understood in a context beyond the metro-village binary and must include a diverse set of geographies, including peri-urban spaces, *desakota* regions, dense villages and small towns. These emergent urban forms combined with improvements in transportation infrastructure go hand-in-hand with mobilities

^{vi} Trans-migration policies to relocate population have been popular since colonial times. See Sukamdi, & Mujahid, G. (2015), ref footnote vi

^{vii} For the first time, the most recent inter-census survey in Indonesia (2015) does include questions about commuting. Understanding whether commuting is trending upward or downward will require multiple observations, however.

that include seasonal and short-term movements, commuting and even return migration. Many migrants travel highly complex paths between geographies of different sizes in order to leverage different kinds of social and economic opportunities. Taken together, how do these new patterns of urbanization and migration help unlock and distribute economic opportunity? We will partially address this question in the last section.

A high degree of variation in migration patterns defines both the motivation for mobility – i.e. the decision to migrate – and the outcomes of migration among different types of migrants. For example, in Indonesia, long-distance migrants who move between provinces have been found to have social and economic outcomes that are equal or better than those of non-migrants;²⁷ but it is also well established in both countries that long-distance migration is undertaken by the relatively well-off who have the economic resources to do so and/or by those who have social networks in place at destination.²⁸

Even though economic reasons do seem to drive migration in many cases, in India, the movement of women for the purposes of marriage fuels the bulk of internal migration. Though migrant women are slightly more likely to be part of the workforce than non-migrant women,²⁹ patriarchal norms continue to place familial and care responsibilities on women as well as dictate the kind of work they do and their freedom of movement. The low, and indeed falling, female workforce participation rates in India

are concerning. While rural women are likely to work in agriculture, in urban India women are increasingly well educated but are exiting the workforce as households get more prosperous. In contrast, despite similar patriarchal norms, a large number of young women in urban Indonesia are seen doing wage work while women in rural Indonesian households exit the workforce.³⁰ It is not uncommon for Indonesian women to migrate to work in large factories and industrial zones, though many drop out of the workforce after marriage.³¹ Due to these gendered differences, women's migration patterns have differed from those of men in both countries, and women remain in lower-paid occupations than their male counterparts.³²

In summary, factors as diverse as socio-economic background, access to networks, and gender have profound influence on the pathways migrants traverse, the type of work they do, and the relationship they establish with their destination.

RESEARCH AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Despite growing evidence of its complexity, the understanding of migration has remained reductive in India and Indonesia. First, because migration is blamed for the rapid growth of cities and the resulting problems of urbanization – including congestion, pollution, and poor public health – policymakers have sought to curtail 'pull' migration by making cities less attractive for migrants. In India, Kundu and Saraswati speak of 'exclusionary urbanization' as is evidenced by slum evictions in metropolitan centers like Delhi

and Mumbai.³³ Mumbai has also seen political mobilization along nativist lines, with a clear anti-migrant rhetoric that has driven controversial policies requiring domicile and residency status for accessing jobs, though such measures have been found unconstitutional.^{viii} In Jakarta, the long-running practice of attempting to exclude unskilled migrants persists today. In the early 1970s, the city government put in place a 'closed city' policy, and in 2012, the Jakarta Governor said, "Jakarta is closed for newcomers who do not have a specific skill or expertise to try their luck in the city."³⁴ Today, only those with Jakarta identity documents are able to receive any state benefits, and local authorities do not process ID cards for newcomers without a guarantee that they have found work.^{35,36} In India too, rural migrants to cities often face exclusions from social protection, especially in accessing subsidized food through the Public Distribution System, as well as in accessing public sector affordable housing schemes.³⁷

Second, consistent with the state's vision of migration as a village-to-metropolis flow, policy has sought to keep people in villages. Both India and Indonesia have implemented numerous programs to reduce the 'push' factors driving migration. Reducing rural-urban distress migration is cited as an achievement of India's well-known rural jobs guarantee program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, which provides rural households with up to 100 days per year of paid

work.³⁸ In Indonesia, the *Dana Desa* (Village Fund) program, which provides block-grants to every village in the country, has been lauded as an opportunity to reduce rural-urban migration.³⁹ The current government under President Joko Widodo has also sought to increase land ownership among rural residents of the country, placing some blame for rural-urban migration on rising land prices driven by speculation.⁴⁰ The government is also implementing "One Village, One Special Product" – a rural development program aimed at encouraging villages to develop their own unique specialized products.⁴¹

In the process of designing policy interventions, governments in countries like India and Indonesia continue to apply simplistic assumptions about internal migration, urbanization, and the relationship between the two.

While this note is not intended to be a direct critique of exclusionary practices of urban governments or rural development programs, we contend that the persistence of these two mutually reinforcing policy frameworks illustrates the durability of the rural-urban and village-metropolis binaries in policy thinking. In the process of designing policy interventions, governments in countries like India and Indonesia continue to apply simplistic assumptions about internal migration, urbanization, and the relationship between the two.

^{viii} In a case related to the rights of women to membership of the Cine Costume Make-up Artists and Hair Dressers Association in Mumbai, the Supreme Court of India in *Charu Khurana v. Union of India* (Civil Writ Petition No. 73/2013) held that the concept of domicile/residence had no rationale and was in violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.

Researchers have at times been complicit – whether intentionally or not – in reinforcing these reductive understandings. Sometimes methodological choices have served to benefit the narrative of village-to-metropolis migration. For example, in Indonesia, most research on internal migration examines inter-provincial – rather than inter-district – flows, and analyzes the absolute volume of migrants as opposed to the share of migrants in total population. Because of its massive population and the fact that its metropolitan area straddles multiple provinces, these methodological choices have placed Jakarta at the center of studies on internal migration in Indonesia, fortifying the belief that megacities are at the heart of migration pathways. In reality, Central Jakarta saw one of the highest rates of out-migration of any district in the country in the period 2005-2010, and only one district of the city core, North Jakarta, saw a rate of in-migration that ranked in the top 100 of all districts in the country.^{ix,42}

Theoretical frameworks coming from the academy have also buttressed government's implicit or explicit policy of dis-incentivizing migration to major urban centers. For example, arguments against in-migration have been made in the fashion of environmental research, invoking the idea of “carrying capacity” to suggest that city size must not grow beyond a certain threshold to avoid catastrophic outcomes.⁴³ The urban systems research of the 1970s and 1980s, building off Zipf's Law,⁴⁴ assumed that there

existed an ideal rank-size rule in city-systems – leading researchers and policymakers to search for ways of halting growth in “over-concentrated” urban regions; the failure of these approaches has also been widely recognized.⁴⁵

Given the importance of internal migration as one of the most profound consequences of the rapid economic development that many countries – India and Indonesia included – are experiencing, researchers must develop new empirical tools and frameworks for analysis that begin to capture the complexity and dynamism of today's patterns of human mobility. These tools must resist the easy binaries of rural-urban and village-metropolis that have long defined migration policy and research; and they must focus on *places* as well as *pathways*. While analyses of places and pathways are complementary and not conflicting, our contention is that more attention must be paid to migrant places in addition to migrant flows, given that policymakers and planners are tasked with governing the former rather than the latter.

This report seeks to make a contribution in this regard by locating migration junctions – geographies profoundly affected and transformed by large-scale internal migration that are often forgotten in simplistic debates about migration and urbanization. Our empirical tool seeks to offer new insight for policymakers and planners as they respond to the increasingly complex landscape of human mobility in emerging economies like India and Indonesia.

^{ix} Own analysis based on sample of Indonesian Census 2010. Rate of in-/out-migration measured as a ratio to the district population. 'District' refers to kota/kabupaten unit of administration

Locating Migration Junctions

METHODS

In order to generate a sharper understanding of the specific geographies that lie at the intersections of migrant pathways, and therefore experience internal migration in the most transformative ways, this report utilizes the tool we call “migrant-intensity.” This empirical approach identifies places that simultaneously receive high numbers of in-migrants and send large numbers of out-migrants. Migrant-intensity examines the share of in-/out-migrants in total local population, rather than the absolute number of migrants.

We define migrant-intensity in terms of both in- and out-migration in order to identify geographies that play the role of both origin and destination, for the same or different groups of migrants. We choose to examine share rather than absolute number based on the presumption that migration plays the largest role in shaping social and economic outcomes in places where a high share of population is mobile, and not necessarily the places that have many migrants simply because they are populous. Our claim is that these two methodological choices make migrant-intensity the right empirical tool for highlighting migration junctions.

The notion of migration junctions could be seen as an expansion of Ravenstein’s thesis of step migration.⁴⁶ However, rather than limiting our

concept to the notion of a migrant moving up the urban hierarchy, we envision a migration junction as a place experiencing a complex mixture of migration patterns. Following the step migration theory, migration junctions could be one rung in the ladder of an urban hierarchy. But they could also be places that return migrants are departing from or returning to; places that draw in migrants for work in one particular sector and send out migrants for work in another; or peri-urban places that lie on the peripheries of large urban agglomerations, receiving middle-class transplants seeking affordable housing and sending out informal workers and students seeking opportunity in the big city. The most defining feature of migration junctions is mobility – in all its forms. In this sense, it must be noted that migrant-intensity – as we are able to employ it – is not a perfect empirical tool for locating migration junctions, as it relies on data that only capture permanent forms of migration, not commuters or seasonal migrants.

At a conceptual level, locating migration junctions means developing a place-based perspective to describe the complex, multivalent forms of migration described above.

At a policy level, identifying migration junctions focuses the attention of researchers and policymakers on specific places that ought to be prioritized in programs and interventions

aimed at promoting the welfare of migrants. This is critical, as the poor management of internal migration can threaten the long-term social and economic health of emerging and developing countries. These policy implications will be further discussed later in the report.

Poor management of internal migration can threaten the long-term social and economic health of emerging and developing countries.

DATA

In order to deploy the migrant-intensity tool to locate migration junctions in India and Indonesia, a few methodological choices have been made on the basis of the available data. Because we are interested in capturing both short- and long-distance movements, we define a migrant as an individual who has recently moved between the largest sub-provincial unit of administration. In India, this unit is the district (*zilla*), and in Indonesia this administrative level is composed of both cities (*kota*) and regencies (*kabupaten*). These two administrative units in Indonesia are treated the same for the purpose of our analysis, as they have the same level of authority and power vis-à-vis the provincial and central governments.

Due to the nature and availability of data, a migrant in India is defined as an individual who

moved during the inter-census period between 1991 and 2001; and in Indonesia a migrant is defined as someone who moved between 2005 and 2010.^x “High levels” of in- and out-migration are defined in relative terms – specifically, a district that falls in the top 20 percent of all districts in the country in terms of share of migrants in total population. Migration junction districts, therefore, are those that fall in the top quintile of both origin and destination rankings. Depending on their particular objectives, future researchers could choose to adjust these definitions – for instance, defining a migrant as anyone living outside his/her place of birth, or a top destination/origin as a district ranking in the top 10 percent.

In terms of data sources, for Indonesia we utilize a sample of 2010 census data, which contains 10 percent of those enumerated in each city/regency across the country, and is made available by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) – a repository of population data from countries around the world, published and maintained by the University of Minnesota. For India, analysis has been conducted using migration-specific D tables from the Census 2001 data, as migration tables from Census 2011 are yet to be released by the Government of India.

^x At the time of this report's preparation, data from 2010 census were the most recent available to the researchers. These data are derived from responses to the question “where did you live 5 years ago?” Forthcoming research will utilize migration data from the time period 2010-2015.

The Geography of Migration Junctions in India and Indonesia

Investigating migration junctions in India and Indonesia highlights a rich diversity of places that are playing important roles in facilitating internal migration. In India, 66 districts are identified as migration junctions – ranging from peripheral outposts in the mountainous regions of the country, to largely rural districts, to industrial areas with secondary and tertiary cities (see **Figure 1** and **Table 1**). In Indonesia, 29 cities and regencies emerge as migration junctions. Again, the cohort is diverse – from major suburbs of Jakarta to small island cities in the remote eastern part of the archipelago (see **Figure 2** and **Table 2**).

A few important trends emerge, which are fruitful to compare across the two countries. First of all, the degree of urbanization among migration junctions differs. In India, more than half of identified districts are less urban than the country as a whole, and only about one in 10 junction districts is greater than 50 percent urban. If anything, migration junctions are more rural than urban in India, aligning with official data showing the prevalence of rural-rural migration. By contrast, in Indonesia migration junctions are far more likely to be urban – with 26 of the 29 identified places being cities and therefore predominantly urban. It is important to note, however, that these trends may not be as different as they appear. Early estimates of the 2001-2011 inter-census period in India show an increase in

urban-urban migration and reduced urban-rural migration – suggesting that the geography of migration junctions may be increasingly urban.

Migration junctions are more rural than urban in India, aligning with official data showing the prevalence of rural-rural migration. By contrast, in Indonesia migration junctions are far more likely to be urban.

Important similarities exist between the location of migration junctions in India and Indonesia. Many of the identified districts in India are home to industrial areas and small secondary and tertiary cities. This is especially true in some of the country's prosperous states with major manufacturing sectors – such as Gujarat, Karnataka and Maharashtra. In other states, these small-city migration junctions are administrative centers and trading hubs with strong rural linkages. Often, urban migration junctions of this nature are located in outlying and peripheral geographies – districts in northeastern states or hilly regions of Himalayan states.

Similarly, many migration junctions in Indonesia are small- and medium-sized cities with populations between 100,000 and 500,000. These cities broadly fall into two different categories. Some are provincial capitals outside

of Java that have benefited from the country's decentralization policy, witnessing an injection of investment from both the central and provincial governments in infrastructure as well as sectors like health and education. In terms of function and location, these cities compare well to India's administrative and trade-oriented migration junctions – characterized by strong rural linkages and important service provision roles, as well as their relatively remote and peripheral geographic locations. One important difference is that Indonesia's administrative and service provision migration junctions are higher up on the country's urban hierarchy – provincial as opposed to district capitals.

Industrial activity is a common feature in the small- and medium-sized urban junctions across the two countries. But whereas manufacturing clusters characterize India's junction towns – usually dominated by small and medium-sized firms and high levels of informality – Indonesia's are more likely to be dominated by large-scale extractive industries. For example, the eastern coast of Kalimantan hosts booming oil and gas industries in addition to several cities that are migration junctions. This may reflect the fact that natural resource industries tend to create short-term opportunities for outsiders – attracting migrants for temporary contracts but failing to sustain a diversified economy with real prospects for economic mobility.⁴⁷

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Surprisingly, peri-urban and satellite towns of major urban agglomerations – which are often cited as examples of India's rapid urbanization and structural transformation – do not show up as migration junctions. In a similar vein, one of the striking trends in Indonesia is the relative absence of Java among migration junctions. Past studies of internal migration in Indonesia have placed Java at the center of the country's domestic migration story, but this may be because those researchers have examined absolute numbers of migrants; with 60 percent of the country's population, it is unsurprising that the absolute number of migrants is highest in Java.

In both India and Indonesia, using the tool of migrant-intensity to identify migration junctions draws attention to geographies that tend to be forgotten in broad narratives about human mobility in emerging economies. The next section explores the policy implications of these findings, and the future directions in which the study of migration junctions might lead researchers, planners and government officials.

Figure 1
Migration Junctions of India




Table 1
Migration Junctions Districts in India (1991-2001)

District			State		
1	Lahul & Spiti	Himachal Pradesh	34	Wardha	Maharashtra
2	Hamirpur	Himachal Pradesh	35	Bhandara	Maharashtra
3	Una	Himachal Pradesh	36	Gadchiroli	Maharashtra
4	Solan	Himachal Pradesh	37	Chandrapur	Maharashtra
5	Shimla	Himachal Pradesh	38	Yavatmal	Maharashtra
6	Kinnaur	Himachal Pradesh	39	Aurangabad	Maharashtra
7	Chandigarh	Chandigarh	40	Nashik	Maharashtra
8	Chamoli	Uttaranchal*	41	Raigarh	Maharashtra
9	Tehri Garhwal	Uttaranchal*	42	Ahmadnagar	Maharashtra
10	Garhwal	Uttaranchal*	43	Solapur	Maharashtra
11	Ambala	Haryana	44	Satara	Maharashtra
12	Ganganagar	Rajasthan	45	Ratnagiri	Maharashtra
13	West Kameng	Arunachal Pradesh	46	Sindhudurg	Maharashtra
14	East Kameng	Arunachal Pradesh	47	Kolhapur	Maharashtra
15	Upper Subansiri	Arunachal Pradesh	48	Sangli	Maharashtra
16	West Siang	Arunachal Pradesh	49	West Godavari	Andhra Pradesh
17	Dibang Valley	Arunachal Pradesh	50	Nellore	Andhra Pradesh
18	Lohit	Arunachal Pradesh	51	Belgaum	Karnataka
19	Aizawl	Mizoram	52	Bagalkot	Karnataka
20	Kokrajhar	Assam	53	Gadag	Karnataka
21	Durg	Chhattisgarh	54	Dharwad	Karnataka
22	Raipur	Chhattisgarh	55	Uttara Kannada	Karnataka
23	Rajkot	Gujarat	56	Udupi	Karnataka
24	Junagadh	Gujarat	57	Dakshina Kannada	Karnataka
25	Bharuch	Gujarat	58	Kodagu	Karnataka
26	The Dangs	Gujarat	59	North Goa	Goa
27	Valsad	Gujarat	60	South Goa	Goa
28	Nandurbar	Maharashtra	61	Lakshadweep	Lakshadweep
29	Dhule	Maharashtra	62	Kannur	Kerala
30	Jalgaon	Maharashtra	63	Thrissur	Kerala
31	Buldana	Maharashtra	64	Ernakulam	Kerala
32	Akola	Maharashtra	65	Pondicherry	Pondicherry
33	Amravati	Maharashtra	66	Andamans	Andaman & Nicobar Islands

*The state has since been renamed Uttarakhand.

Figure 2
Migration Junctions of Indonesia




Table 2
Migration Junctions in Indonesia (2005-2010)

Kota (City)	Province	Kota (City)	Province	Kota (City)	Province	Kota (City)	Province
1 Sabang	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	9 Padang Panjang	Sumatera Barat	17 Bontang	Kalimantan Timur	25 Tual	Maluku
2 Banda Aceh	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	10 Solok	Sumatera Barat	18 Samarinda	Kalimantan Timur	26 Jayapura	Papua
3 Dumai	Riau	11 Bengkulu	Bengkulu	19 Balikpapan	Kalimantan Timur	Kabupaten (Regency)	Province
4 Batam	Kepulauan Riau	12 Jakarta Utara	Jakarta(DKI)	20 Denpasar	Bali	27 Nabire	Papua
5 Tanjung Pinang	Kepulauan Riau	13 Tangerang	Banten	21 Palu	Sulawesi Tengah	28 Jayapura	Papua
6 Pekanbaru	Riau	14 Yogyakarta	Yogyakarta(DIY)	22 Kendari	Sulawesi Tenggara	29 Siak	Riau
7 Bukittinggi	Sumatera Barat	15 Palangka Raya	Kalimantan Tengah	23 Bau-Bau	Sulawesi Tenggara		
8 Payakumbuh	Sumatera Barat	16 Tarakan	Kalimantan Utara	24 Ternate	Maluku Utara		

Policy Directions for Migration Junctions

Employment and urbanization are two of the biggest policy conversations in contemporary emerging economies. Both are closely related to internal migration – though in more nuanced ways than policy dialogue and public discourse have often assumed. In both India and Indonesia, much of the potential for structural transformation and related urban-led job creation and economic growth is yet to be realized. Recognition of diverse patterns of migration across a range of geographies is important to integrating economic and physical mobility in policymaking.

Employment and urbanization are two of the biggest policy conversations in contemporary emerging economies. Both are closely related to internal migration – though in more nuanced ways than policy dialogue and public discourse have often assumed.

In this context, the identification of migration junctions can help to redraw mental maps of internal migration pathways in countries like India and Indonesia. But the empirical tool also intends to draw government attention to places that are grappling with the constant in- and out-flow of migrants, with the contention that planners and policymakers in these geographies face particular challenges in accounting for the higher degree of transience among local residents and workers.

The policy considerations for migration junction are many, but this section explores three specific dimensions of urban and regional planning: administrative jurisdictions and coordinated governance, workforce development, and housing.

ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS

One of the most important policy areas to examine in the context of migration junctions relates to how urban and regional geographies are governed. In spaces that accommodate in- and out-migrants simultaneously, issues like workforce development, job creation, housing, services and infrastructure are at once local and regional. For migration junctions, it is particularly important that institutions at different levels of administrative authority have defined mandates and well-developed mechanisms for coordination.

This problem relates to the question of how localized authority should be. While movements to decentralize authority are widespread across the globe, particularly in the global South, different countries have chosen different pathways. In India, for example, despite constitutional amendments that empowered urban local bodies 25 years ago,^{xi} in practice authority is concentrated in the hands of state governments. Municipal bodies in India are responsible for little more than basic service provision, while district-level bureaucrats have

^{xi} The 73rd and 74th amendments of the Constitution of India came into effect in 1992.

more power and state governments – who hold the most authority, particularly over expenditures – are far removed from the local context and often resort to technocratic, less participatory forms of government.

[These] different models of decentralization have important impacts on the ability of migration junctions to govern themselves in ways that promote the welfare and economic mobility of their transient populations.

In Indonesia, the process of decentralization has extended to a more local level – empowering sub-provincial cities and regencies. For example, cities and regencies set their own regulations related to the sale and purchase of land, develop and manage investment strategies, and even have some control over labor regulations like minimum wage. One constraint of the Indonesian model, however, is the lack of coordination at a regional scale; cities and regencies often view each other as competitors and regional authorities – i.e. the province – have limited powers over local authorities.

These different models of decentralization have important impacts on the ability of migration junctions to govern themselves in ways that promote the welfare and economic mobility of their transient populations. For example, in Indonesia, manufacturing hubs often draw migrants from neighboring districts – young workers who plan to work for a portion of their productive years and then return home,

many with the ambition to start a business. Coordination between the regency of origin and the regency of destination could take the form of a savings and loan program, where migrants are incentivized to save and accumulate capital for their future enterprise, simultaneously receiving entrepreneurship training. The regency of origin would have an incentive to implement such a program, but the regency of destination would need to be involved in its execution.

As our understanding of the various types of migration junctions deepens, the particular requirements for coordination across different administrative units will also become clearer. For example, the data in this study do not capture seasonal and commuter patterns of migration, though these are important and prevalent trends in both India and Indonesia. Migration junctions characterized by these patterns may demand that local and regional governments better coordinate transportation policies. For example, the regulation of transportation is done at the district level in India through Regional Transport Authorities (RTAs) and migration junctions that draw in labor from across the district boundary may have to look at governance structures that allow district-level transport authorities to collaborate – for example, through the creation of multi-RTA jurisdictions.

Broadly speaking, migration junctions demand new ways of governing across local and regional scales. To highlight a few specific examples of how, we delve more deeply into the issues of workforce development and housing.

WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

A migration junction faces particular challenges and opportunities when it comes to vocational training programs. The constraints arise from difficulty in predicting future patterns of labor market demand and supply – an essential driver of any coherent workforce development strategy. In a migration junction, local workers are likely to hold ambitions to relocate, while many of those who will occupy future jobs are likely to come from elsewhere. This dramatically complicates efforts to craft a long-term skill development strategy, since many workforce development initiatives seek to realize economic potential by matching local assets with human capital, assuming a relatively stable local labor force. In other words, effectively targeting the right group of workers for training programs becomes a difficult task in migration junctions.

If different kinds of workers and migrants are transiting through these spaces – whether on their way in or out – they are perhaps strategic locations for governments to concentrate their workforce development efforts.

The other challenge for migration junctions is related to the ecosystem necessary to promote successful workforce development programs. New arrivals – those who have just migrated to the city or community seeking work – may be appropriate targets of training programs. However, this population is more likely than established

residents of the city to face vulnerabilities related to housing, income and mobility – and may even face linguistic and cultural barriers to integration. In order to be effective, a training program that targets new arrivals must be sensitive to these other, coincident factors. This requires a high degree of coordination between workforce development and other policy interventions – those around housing, transport, and social welfare, for example – than would otherwise be required. This provides a strong argument for investments in improving governing capacity in migration junctions.

However, certain unique opportunities around skill development do exist for migration junctions. The most apparent arises from the fact that these locations function as “crossroads” in the internal migration landscape. If different kinds of workers and migrants are transiting through these spaces – whether on their way in or out – they are perhaps strategic locations for governments to concentrate their workforce development efforts. For instance, training institutions in a single geography could cater to rural migrants who intend to return to their villages – skilling them in advanced farming and agro-processing techniques; sales and service workers seeking employment in small towns and peri-urban areas; and business process outsourcing (BPO) workers who will eventually work in large metropolitan areas. Governments with limited resources could invest in physical facilities in migration junctions that serve multiple workforce development needs.

HOUSING

A higher share of migrants in total population poses obvious challenges to urban planning and management, especially for the inclusion of migrants in the provision of housing and basic services. In India, migrants are often excluded from social housing projects, usually through restrictive eligibility criteria that demands proof showing a certain number of years of residence in the state or other identity documents like the below-poverty-line (BPL) card, which is also tied to a particular place. Formal-sector affordable housing in both countries is inadequate, forcing low-income migrants to live in informal areas where tenure security and access to basic services like water and sanitation are a significant problem.

Migration junctions would need to think more deeply about these issues, implementing improved policy frameworks for migrant inclusion. Foremost is the inclusion of rental housing within housing strategies, instead of or in addition to the current focus on home ownership. Junctions must move toward large-scale construction and management of dormitories, working women's hostels and family rental units. Functional rental markets will also help migration junctions particularly, allowing out-migrants to

lease out their homes and making for an efficient use of existing housing stock.

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Local governments should consider that excessive zeal in redevelopment of informal settlements like kampungs, urban villages and slums may also take away the informal rental housing supply that sustains migrant populations. A more incremental approach may be more appropriate – for example, extending basic services like water and sewerage to informal settlements.⁴⁸ Non-networked systems for delivering water and sewerage instead of traditional piped systems can substantially improve health outcomes and economic productivity for migrant populations. Given their flexibility, these systems are also useful given that migration junctions can experience rapid changes in their demographics, with people moving in and out over short periods of time.

Conclusion

Migration junctions in countries like India and Indonesia lie at the intersections of complex, multi-directional migration pathways. Identifying these geographies serves not only to shine light on the complicated, non-linear forms of physical mobility that coincide with structural transformation in today's emerging economies; it also directs policymakers' attention to places that require careful planning and intervention to ensure that migrants' physical mobility is closely linked to their economic mobility. Migration junctions need policy frameworks that create enabling environments for incoming migrants while simultaneously preparing out-migrating populations to leverage opportunities in future destinations. These frameworks are crucial components of the broader effort in countries like India and Indonesia to leverage the "demographic dividend" by providing productive opportunities to young people.

This report has identified migration junctions and presented a set of stylized facts about the geography and nature of migration junctions in India and Indonesia. Future research questions abound: What is the nature of local economies and employment patterns in migration junctions? What does a relatively higher incidence of migration junctions in one country versus another reveal about its labor market? Do migration junctions offer lessons in how to maintain low barriers to labor market entry and exit for migrant workers? Do women find particular kinds of economic opportunities in migration junctions? Such explorations would serve the ongoing project of broadening and nuancing the narrative around internal migration in rapidly changing societies of the global South – with the aim of shaping more inclusive policies that promote migrants' well-being and economic mobility.

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