What makes the fox

Development scholar Robert Chambers famously adopted the ancient saying, “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing” as an analogy to describe the ways in which people secure their livelihoods, comparing those with a single job and specialisation to hedgehogs, and those who maintained a diverse portfolio of activities to foxes. Chambers argues that while full-time employees are ordinarily hedgehogs, most poor people cannot afford to be full-time employees. Poor families tend instead to be foxes, with different household members seeking different sources of livelihood, often in different ways and places, and at different times of the year in order to survive and improve their quality of life. In a developing country like Thailand, such a concept of livelihood diversification has long been used to describe the way rural low-income families often combine farm and non-farm work as a survival strategy.  ¹

In recent years, however, a new form of livelihood diversification has emerged, fuelled by the COVID-accelerated rise of the platform economy. The new world of digital work through platforms enables easy access to a wide range of flexible work opportunities, giving rise to a new kind of fox — namely, those individuals who utilise online platforms to engage in a diverse range of economic activities, sometimes in addition to their salaried employment. The days of the hedgehog, the full-time employee with only one job, are in the past, as are the days in which fox-like strategies were largely confined to the rural poor. With an ecosystem of work enabled through digital platforms, it is now common to see a white-collar employee in Bangkok diversify her or his livelihood by offering gig services and/or selling goods on the internet as side hustles. ²

This study seeks to describe the opportunities and challenges associated with livelihood diversification for the modern-day Thai worker in an increasingly technologically-driven world of work. While this new world of work allows workers to engage in multiple livelihoods and switch between jobs, occupations, and sectors more frequently and with greater speed, the current trends also point to more precarity in working conditions. Importantly, while women may be more likely to adopt this diversification, this research shows that they are also disproportionately burdened by it.

This study is based on primary data collected between July 2021 and June 2022 through 100 surveys and 79 in-depth interviews with workers and entrepreneurs in Thailand. These interviews were part of a larger three-country study titled “Opportunities, Costs and Outcomes of Platformised Home-based Work for Women,” funded by the International Development Research Centre, Canada, and conducted in collaboration by the JustJobs Network, Kenan Foundation Asia (Thailand), Centre for Economic and Social Development (Myanmar), and Nuppun Research and Consulting (Cambodia). 

A new form of livelihood diversification

A livelihood is about more than just earning an income. A livelihood is both dependent on, and is an enabler of, access to a range of social and economic goods such as social networks, public services, and property rights. The fox-like strategy of diversifying livelihoods, therefore, goes beyond mere income diversification, not only augmenting earning, but working as an effective risk management strategy and source of resilience. Hence, factors other than income, such as access to social security benefits, may influence diversification decisions and patterns. 

Notably, scholars have long recognised that livelihood diversification is not restricted to the poor. More affluent workers may also choose to practise multiple occupations. The difference, however, is that the poor are usually coerced by their circumstances into diversifying their livelihoods, and are often constrained to low-productivity work, whereas the more affluent enjoy greater agency and choice.

Livelihood diversification has characterised Thailand’s rural lifestyle for decades. Most farms in the country are smallholdings – parcels of land below two hectares (approximately five acres or 12.5 rai) – whose yields are insufficient for farmers to sustain themselves with. This, combined with the volatility and seasonality of agricultural work, makes livelihood diversification an attractive option. Agricultural workers engage in non-farm work while holding on to their small landholdings and farm livelihoods. However, the precarity of the former means that landholdings serve as a kind
of insurance. 

This is another heading

To be clear, there is no single uniform pattern of livelihood diversification in Thailand. Nonetheless, a typical pattern depicted in the literature is that of a rural smallholder household in which some family members remain in their hometown to tend the farm, while other members migrate to urban/industrial areas to do non-farm work. Members may also switch between farm and non-farm occupations at different times of the year and throughout the course of their lives.

Unlike the rural foxes widely described in the literature, the platformised, largely urban foxes of today can switch between multiple occupations frequently, and sometimes within a single day, possibly within the comfort of their own home. Many types of digital platforms, such as social media, e-commerce, freelance, and crowdwork, enable individuals to take up different ventures at any time, from anywhere, and with relatively little start-up costs. Given its ease and flexibility, the practice of multiple jobholding to diversify livelihoods has become increasingly common, including among middle-class, white-collar workers. 

Box 1 describes three case studies of women workers who adopted a range of livelihood diversification strategies. 

Key characteristics of the modern fox

These case studies not only demonstrate the different ways in which people nowadays diversify their livelihoods, but also offer a glimpse into the lived experiences of those who do so. In particular, the cases point to three common characteristics of modern foxes engaged in platformised work. First, they are multifunctional workers who hold concurrent engagements in several, sometimes very different, occupations. Second, they can switch between jobs, occupations and sectors frequently and quickly. And third, they are often confronted with economic uncertainty, or precarity. 

Based on this sample, multifunctionality appears to represent the norm rather than exception when it comes to the profile of a typical worker in the post-COVID era. Manow embodies the most common pattern in the study’s sample – she has one full-time salaried job and engages in online gig work/business to supplement her income. Another common route is the one taken by Lookpad, whose livelihood is sustained through a combination of various gig roles. More extreme and less common are cases like Yam’s, who engages in gig work despite having two salaried jobs. Remarkably, these multifunctional individuals often do not fit neatly within a singular occupation or industry, and many of their employment statuses could be described as simultaneously formal and informal. Their multifunctionality is not currently captured in national statistics, which categorise workers into single occupations and industries, and by rigid divisions of formal and informal employment.

Related to multifunctionality, the second key characteristic of modern-day foxes engaging in digitally-enabled platform work is that they can shift between jobs, occupations, and sectors frequently and with speed. With the rise of the platform economy, workers today can switch between different roles and alter their portfolio of activities at a pace never seen before. This is perhaps most clearly evident in the example of Yam, who went from working solely as a flight attendant to working online as a promoter, clothing retailer, and food seller, and now works mainly as a flight attendant, radio host, and promoter – all within the span of less than two years. In the wake of COVID, workers have come to realise that they need to possess the ability to quickly transition between different sources of livelihood in case their main source is suddenly disrupted, as was the case for the examples above and more than half the participants in the study. 

But while many workers make use of digital platforms to compensate for labour market precarity, platform work is itself inherently precarious. First, platform workers are not legally recognised as “employees” in Thailand; this prevents them from being protected under labour protection laws, and from accessing the type of social security benefits where employers make contributions – since they supposedly do not have employers. Second, because platform work is easy to enter into, the competition is intense, causing workers’ incomes to stagnate or decline over time; this was the case for Manow and many other participants in the study. Third, platform workers have no control over how the platforms operate. A common complaint among the research participants was that changes in platform algorithms made it harder for customers to see them compared to when they first started working, which in turn led to a decline in their income. 

These conditions contribute to poor well-being among those who engage in platform work, while also exacerbating the precaritisation of work. Not only do workers need to maintain their full-time employment in order to access labour protections and social security entitlements, but those who do keep both a full-time job and a gig job will not be fully protected by labour laws, since a gig portion of their work is not covered by the law. For instance, the maximum number of working hours under Thai law is eight hours per day and 48 hours per week, but those who perform gig work in addition to a regular day job are bound to exceed this stipulated maximum. Uncertainties that come with intense competition and a lack of control over platforms also contribute to the tendency to overwork. As with all three case studies in Box 1, most modern foxes have difficulties maintaining a healthy work-life balance. Furthermore, the popularity of platform work is driving the informalisation of labour, as once-formal activities are increasingly outsourced to gig workers. In addition, the widespread recognition that platforms could be used to diversify livelihoods may be undercutting attempts to improve labour welfare. This is reflected in the attitudes and behaviour of most workers in our study, who chose to seek new livelihood sources instead of demanding better conditions from their primary source. 

What about women?

While modern foxes of all genders tend to face similar challenges, women deserve particular attention as they are more likely to engage in platform work and to struggle with achieving a healthy work-life balance. Like many countries, Thailand continues to see gender disparities in labour force participation owing mainly to the fact that women shoulder a disproportionate burden of unpaid domestic and care work. As of 2022, the female workforce participation rate stood at 60 percent (18 million out of 31 million women), while the male rate was 77 percent (21 million out of 28 million men). Preoccupation with household work was the primary reason behind women’s non-participation in the labour force – cited by 40 percent, or 4.9 million, of the 12.2 million women who were not part of the workforce. In contrast, only four percent, or about 282,000, of the 6.5 million men who were outside of the workforce cited household work as the reason for non-participation. Our study sample also showed that women were likely to spend more time doing care work than men. The case of Lookpad, who assumed the primary caretaking role for her mother despite having a brother, is an example of this trend. 

Furthermore, the gender pay gap remains a pressing issue. According to UN Women (2020), the pay gap between men and women in Thailand was 10.94 percent as of 2020, with women earning 89.1 cents to every dollar that men earned. The gap could be partially explained by gender-based discrimination in the workplace; the larger wage penalty for motherhood than for fatherhood; the larger proportion of women in sectors with low wage premiums (e.g. education, social work, agriculture, etc.) and the larger proportion of men who find employment in sectors with high wage premiums (e.g. utilities, transportation, construction, etc.).

Care work obligations drive women to seek greater flexibility in work, as a result of which they may be drawn to platform work opportunities. At the same time, the flexible nature of platform work – especially the absence of fixed schedules and the fact that certain types of online work can be performed entirely at home – blurs the boundary between personal life and work life. Women feel this burden disproportionately, finding it particularly difficult to maintain a work-life balance. Some participants in our study who worked at home recounted the pressures of having to engage in care work while already being at work. Engaging in multiple roles simultaneously in multifunctional ways is especially challenging for women, who must also perform the additional role of caretaker.

Towards better livelihoods

In summary, the platform economy has given rise to a new kind of workers: those who are multifunctional and shift between jobs, occupations and even sectors with relative ease, speed and frequency, but also face increasing precarity. It is no longer just the rural poor who are forced to adopt a livelihood diversification strategy; increasing labour market uncertainty and the growing precaritisation of work are also forcing members of the urban middle-class to diversify their sources of income. Meanwhile, the disproportionate burdens imposed upon women by existing gender disparities are exacerbated by the conditions of platform work and livelihood diversification trends. These findings, in turn, point to the following policy implications, which could benefit all modern workers, especially women. 

First, the Thai government should rethink the methodologies it adopts to collect and analyse statistical data. The current practice of singular occupational categorisation cannot accurately capture the realities of today’s labour and may lead to poor planning and policies. For instance, the latest Informal Employment Survey claims that workers in informal employment work an average of 41 hours/week, while those in formal employment work an average of 45 hours/week, both considered to be within the acceptable range of number of working hours. However, as this essay has illustrated, such a figure is likely to be inaccurate as the survey does not account for multifunctionality. The same survey also shows that there are more men than women in informal employment – both as a share of all workers in informal employment and as a share of total employment for each gender; but it is unclear whether this accounts for informal employment via online platforms. More generally, since individuals are rigidly categorised by national surveys as being either formally or informally employed, national statistics on gig workers (and platform workers more specifically) remain wanting, thus constraining the design and implementation of appropriate labour laws and policies. 

Relatedly, Thailand’s labour laws and social security system are in need of reform. The employee versus non-employee and formal versus informal dichotomies need to be done away with, and all workers should receive equal labour protection and social security benefits regardless of their employment status. Importantly, if workers are able to access protection and benefits through a gig job, they may not be pushed into juggling multiple occupational roles and an excessive workload. This would promote worker welfare, particularly for women. 

Third, since work is precarious and the modern worker needs to have the ability to transition from one role to the other, the government should pay increasing attention to the kinds of skills that need to be promoted in the workforce. While specialised technical skills no doubt remain important, transferrable skills may now be more crucial than ever. And as with work opportunities, it is vital that skill development opportunities be accessed in a flexible manner to cater to the needs of women. 

It is vital that these more immediate actions be accompanied by sustained efforts to promote gender equity in Thai society. It is highly likely that current work trends will change and evolve, and there is a possibility that the platform economy is replaced by something else altogether. Whatever the future of work, a large number of women will continue to be disproportionately burdened without a broad shift in gender norms and expectations.